Is the formation of investor networks associated with superior fund performance? Our analysis of more than 2,000 private equity real estate (PERE) funds over three decades reveals abnormal performance among PERE funds dominated by institutional investor cliques. Specifically, investor cliques with a more extensive history of joint investment are associated with superior fund performance that is not explained by common fund characteristics. Such correlation is not predicted by a simple Bayesian update without access to private information, implying that investor networks may be a channel through which limited partners identify and access better-performing fund managers. We also provide evidence that Limited Partner (LP) networks are not a mere result of rational herding by showing that the clique-level Herfindahl–Hirschman Index for investor AUM does not positively predict greater abnormal return. We further observe that investor cliques prolong the time needed to reach maximal commitment. As General Partners (GP) are known to utilize a subscription line of credit to borrow against committed capital to boost return, we infer more financing discretion granted to GPs by cliques.