Using a regulation implemented by SEBI in November 2016 as an exogeneous shock, I test whether firms with bad quality of information disclosures attempt to conceal firm-specific information when faced with a business environment marked with heightened disclosure quality requirement mandated by law for the CRAs. Specifically, the study empirically attempts to analyze whether regulation is sufficient to create a separating equilibrium, in terms of the quality of disclosures to CRAs by firms. I find a statistically significant decrease in number of security issuances and number of CRAs bad type firms engage with, as well as an increase in the number of security downgrades that they suffer in the post-regulation environment. However, the decrease in number of issues is weakened if the firm is listed, has high proportion of independent directors in its board or gets its statements audited by a Big 4 auditor, all of which signal that the firm is of a good type. These findings indicate that bad type firms strategically chose to reduce their issuances and initiate new firm-CRA relationships after the regulation to conceal their firm type, but they weren’t successful in escaping from the suffering for long.