Home Menu
icon-menu-close.svg

The Max-Min Solution for Variable Threat Games

01/07/1988

The Max-Min Solution for Variable Threat Games

Lahiri Somdeb

Working Papers

  • facebook
  • linkedin
  • twitter
  • whatsapp

In this paper we obtain general inequality properties that max-min strategic solutions to Variable Threat Games satisfy under a set of very plausible assumptions.

Recommended Articles

CSRIndeX: A Python tool for computing normative CSR benchmarks from SEC filings

Sundaravalli Narayanaswami, Aparna Raj C, Sundaravalli Narayanaswami

CSRIndeX: A Python tool for computing normative CSR benchmarks from SEC filings

Role of foreign market knowledge and home country institutions in international entrepreneurship-performance relationship: A meta-analysis

Amit Karna, Sai Chittaranjan Kalubandi, Dibyendu Sharma, Saneesh Edacherian, Amit Karna

Role of foreign market knowledge and home country institutions in international entrepreneurship-performance relationship: A meta-analysis

Dynamic order assignment under warehouse disruption risks: A switching-curve policy, heuristics, and insights

Debjit Roy, Govind Lal Kumawat, Debjit Roy

Dynamic order assignment under warehouse disruption risks: A switching-curve policy, heuristics, and insights
IIMA