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The Max-Min Solution for Variable Threat Games

01/07/1988

The Max-Min Solution for Variable Threat Games

Lahiri Somdeb

Working Papers

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In this paper we obtain general inequality properties that max-min strategic solutions to Variable Threat Games satisfy under a set of very plausible assumptions.

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